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12 June 1964

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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
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*USSR - East Germany: [In giving the US advance notice that it will sign a mutual assistance treaty with East Germany today, Moscow aims to reassure the West that, while it feels obliged to enhance the status and prestige of the Ulbricht regime, it has no intention of provoking a new Berlin crisis.]

[With the exception of Albania, East Germany until now has been the only Eastern European state with which the USSR has not signed such a treaty. The treaty probably is, in part, to demonstrate that Moscow's determination to protect East Germany against foreign pressures or attacks has not diminished despite the Soviet commitment to relax international tensions.]

[The treaty will also have the effect of reaffirming the USSR's long-standing position that East Germany's existing frontiers were established by the Potsdam Conference in 1945 and are not subject to negotiation.]

[The conclusion of this treaty will not in itself have any effect on existing Western rights in West Berlin or on Western access to the city. The Soviet precautionary move in notifying the US in advance appears consistent with other indications that the USSR and East Germany do not presently contemplate any attempt to challenge or modify Western access procedures.]

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*Laos: Following talks with King Savang on 10 June, Souvanna told the US ambassador he would approve renewed US reconnaissance flights.

He indicated he would not object if the US felt it necessary to provide armed escorts on these missions. Souvanna also said he wished to make "maximum use" of the US-supplied T-28 aircraft to "really punish" the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces.

The Pathet Lao, meanwhile, are continuing to protest alleged US bombing and strafing of their "liberated areas." Yesterday they charged that six American planes had bombed and strafed the Pathet Lao headquarters at Khang Khay "in a savage and outrageous way." They called for continued efforts to shoot down US aircraft.

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South Vietnam: [General Khanh has indicated that he may reorganize his government.]

[Under proposed changes he outlined to US Ambassador Lodge on 9 June, Khanh would become president, with responsibility for broad strategy and the war effort. He would designate a prime minister to handle routine domestic affairs.]

[Khanh implied that the prime minister would be a civilian. He also spoke of creating a "council of state" to which he would appoint the present chief of state, General Minh.]

[Khanh's thinking may be influenced in part by recent criticism from Saigon's politically active intellectual community. On 5 June a group of politicians announced they had petitioned Khanh to make changes such as he now envisages. They also demanded a new advisory council of politicians to broaden the government's popular base. The petitioners include members of the defunct Council of Notables as well as signers of a similar "Caravelle" petition to Diem in 1960.]

[Khanh has come under increasing criticism from members of his cabinet, both civilian and military, who feel he is concentrating too much authority in his own hands.]

[Khanh's interest in reorganizing the government may stem from a belief that this would enable him to avoid constant involvement in disruptive political and religious issues and to ease disaffected General Minh out of the government.]

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South Korea: [Continuing behind-the-scenes maneuvering may threaten President Pak's control.]

[Important army generals who remain loyal to Pak insist that Kim Chong-pil must be exiled as the first step toward solving the crisis. Some officers are suspicious that army chief of staff General Min Ki-sik is involved in a conspiracy with Kim, since he is unwilling to join them in telling Kim to leave the country.]

[Kim has made initial moves toward arranging to come to the US, but he is seeking a status that will be the least damaging to his prestige. He is reported to believe that even if he leaves the country, he will be recalled to head the governing Democratic Republican Party within a few months.]

[The military leaders are concerned over the possibility that Kim's hard-core supporters may take some desperate action to save him--a possibility that is intensified by his remaining in South Korea. In addition, the generals fear that Kim might allege that Pak has been involved in some illegal activities and thus make it impossible for Pak to remain in power.]

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* Venezuela: A student strike at the Central University in Caracas may present the Leoni administration with its first major crisis.

The strike, which began on 10 June, was called by the Communist-dominated student federation to protest a recent university ruling that students who fail examinations in two consecutive years will be expelled. Of the university's 18,000 students, as many as 3,000--some of whom have been involved in Communist-directed terrorism--are affected by the ruling.

The strike appears to be almost completely effective. Social Christian Party students are supporting the strike in a desperate effort to gain votes in next week's student elections. Also, the Communists have threatened severe reprisals against strikebreakers.

So far the strike has been peaceful. Should trouble break out, however, and the police attempt to intervene, the violence could quickly spread far beyond the university campus.

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Congo: [Former Katangan leader Moise Tshombé is stepping up his campaign to return to the Congo and a leading role in national politics.]

[In a press conference in Paris on 10 June, Tshombé sharply criticized the Adoula government's handling of the mounting security crisis. He reiterated his view that the Congo needs a more broadly based government of all factions, including leaders currently in prison--such as former leftist Stanleyville leader Gizenga, or in exile--such as Tshombé himself and the Brazzaville-based Committee of National Liberation.]

[In a probable reference to the newly formed African Democratic Committee (CDA) which seeks to supplant Adoula, Tshombé said he had the support of several "movements based in Leopoldville" and was ready to be their leader once an amnesty was proclaimed. He stated he was leaving soon for a tour of several African countries. According to press sources, he was in Bamako yesterday.]

[As the Congo security situation has worsened, pressures have mounted for a change of government. An increasing number of Congolese, including some of Adoula's former supporters, have come to believe that Tshombé should be included in, if not head of, a new government.]

[Tshombé's statement seems certain to increase the pressures on President Kasavubu to drop Adoula from the top post. The President is expected, perhaps before the end of the month, to appoint a "transitional" government to rule until new parliamentary elections are held next year.]

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Pakistan: The government has as yet made no official comment on the higher level of US military assistance in loans and grants to India of which it was notified on 4 June.

An editorial appearing yesterday in the Karachi paper Dawn may be the first signal of the government line.

The paper attacks the US agreement to provide further military assistance to India as "morally indefensible," and says that this aid imperils the chances for a settlement in Kashmir. The editorial calls for a reassessment of Pakistan's foreign policy, adding that "the question is whether the time has come to say goodbye" to the CENTO and SEATO alliances.

Dawn is prone to exaggerated statements, and the editorial cited may only reflect the serious Pakistani pique which has existed for some time over the evolving US relationship with India.

On the other hand, the Government of Pakistan may be preparing some major new complaint or even a further shift in its relations with the US.

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Ceylon: The addition of three Marxist leaders to the cabinet yesterday may have strengthened Prime Minister Bandaranaike's shaky political position only for the present.

The new ministers are drawn from the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), which supports parliamentary state socialism at home and nonalignment abroad. LSSP leader N. M. Perera, for nearly 30 years one of Ceylon's leading political figures, will take over the key finance portfolio. Perera's predecessor, T. B. Ilangaratne--heretofore the left anchor of the cabinet--now will direct Ceylon's trade.

The right wing of Mrs. Bandaranaike's party is bitter over the move, and this may ultimately nullify the bolstering of her slim majority in Parliament. Several powerful right-wingers had threatened to leave the party if the Marxists were brought in. They may yet bolt and bring down the government if deteriorating economic conditions continue to erode its popular support.

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NOTES

Canada-Hungary: [Canadian and Hungarian negotiators have reached agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations and a trade deal to be approved by the Canadian cabinet. Although the Hungarians will send about 15 officials to Ottawa and Montreal, where they will set up a trade office, the Canadians have no immediate plans to open a diplomatic post in Budapest. Under the trade agreement, Canada will extend most-favored-nation treatment to Hungary in return for Budapest's purchase of \$21-24 million worth of Canadian cereals over a three-year period.]

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Saudi Arabia: A current total boycott of ARAMCO dining facilities by the company's Saudi employees may be followed by an illegal work stoppage which might lead to violence involving Saudi forces in the Eastern Province, according to US officials in Dhahran. The boycott's effectiveness has revealed an extremely well-disciplined organization whose leaders have not been identified.

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